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RECENT DECISIONS .
type of result are, unfortunately, often ineffectual. The pardoning
power, often suggested as an ameliorating force in this area, is
usually vested solely in the governor of the state. Beset with many
responsibilities in addition to the exercise of this power, a governor
might find it difficult to strike a proper and judicious balance in its
use. Another consideration is the inefficiency which must neces-
sarily result from the exercise of the pardoning power on an ad hoc
basis.
It is therefore submitted that the most effective remedy for this
problem would take the form of statutory enactment. Legislation
would not only provide a precise and definite solution, but an
imperative one as well. Continued legislative acquiescence in the
present situation might well be taken as approval of the currently
accepted doctrine as enunciated in the case at bar. This need for
legislation has been recognized and adopted by an increasing number
of jurisdictions and probably indicates a developing trend in this
area of law.
In any event, the fact that some form of change is needed
becomes apparent from thoughtful reflection upon the nature of
punishment itself. While the purpose of punishment in primitive
societies may have been retribution directed at the criminal himself,
such a philosophy is inappropriate in a civilized society. Rather,
it should be the aim of society to rehabilitate the criminal, and to
deter other would-be wrongdoers from committing similar pro-
hibited acts. A rule which denies a prisoner credit for time already
served under his original conviction, upon a second conviction for
the same crime, has no valid purpose in and of itself. The
application of this harsh doctrine results only in resentment of
society by men who are required, under the rule of the instant case,
to throw years, futilely spent in prisons, into the bottomless pit of
legal anachronism.
EVIDENCE- CRIMINAL PRETRIAL HEARING-EVIDENCE AD-
MITTED AT PRETRIAL HEARING IN DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE IS
INVALID BASIS FOR CONVICTION. - On an indictment for a felony,
a pretrial hearing was held in the absence of the defendant, at which
a motion was made to suppress evidence alleged to have been
illegally seized. No explanation was given for the defendant's
absence, but his counsel was present at the hearing and actively
advocated the defendant's position. The motion was denied, and
at the subsequent trial, the defendant and his codefendant were
convicted. In reversing both convictions, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a conviction based upon evidence ruled admissible
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at a pretrial hearing conducted in the defendant's absence was
contrary to New York public policy as well as a violation of
"fundamental fairness." People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 213
N.E.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1965).
It was a common-law maxim that no man could be punished
without an opportunity to be heard." The reasoning behind this
rule has been expressed in terms of the necessity of affording
justice, rather than merely rendering the correct decision: "he who
determines any matter without hearing both sides, though he may
have been right, has not done justice." ' 2 Consequently, Blackstone
states that the accused must be present before any fact, in either a
civil or criminal proceeding, can be tried.3  Both the federal and
the New York State constitutions protect against the ancient evil
of the "secret trial" by insuring that a defendant in certain criminal
prosecutions must be present for the proceeding to be valid. This
procedural guarantee, although not expressly stated in the United
States Constitution, has been considered a requirement of due
process.4
The landmark decision of Snyder v. Massachusettss discussed
the extent to which the federal constitution, through the requirement
of due process, guarantees a defendant's personal presence at a
criminal prosecution. Therein, the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant had no right to be present when the jury
was permitted to view the scene of the crime. Mr. Justice Cardozo
indicated that an accused's presence at a felony prosecution is
guaranteed "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably sub-
stantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the
charge."6' Consequently, the requirement of personal presence does
not exist "when presence would be useless." 7 The Court did not
determine whether the viewing of the scene of the crime was
technically part of the trial; rather, it relied upon the rule that a
state may adopt its own procedural regulations "unless in so doing
it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."s
The New York State Constitution expressly states that no
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise "infamous
crime" unless "the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
' Terrell v. Allison, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 289 (1874).
24 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARmS *283. Here, Blackstone is quoting the
Roman statesman Seneca; the translation is from BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
1412 (4th ed. 1951).3 4 BLACXSTONE;, COMMENTARIES *283.4 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
5 Ibid.61d. at 105-06.
Id. at 106-07.
8 Id. at 105.
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defend in person ... ." ' This right to be present during a criminal
trial was clarified by the New York State Legislature when it stated
that "if the indictment be for a misdemeanor, the trial may be had
in the absence of the defendant, if he appear by counsel but if the
indictment be for a felony the defendant must be personally
present." 20 In Maurer v. People,'- the New York Court of
Appeals, construing a similar statute in 1870,12 determined that
"trial" referred to "all proceedings had in impanneling [sic] the
jury, the introduction of evidence, the summing up of counsel, and
the charge of the court to the jury, [as well as] receiving and
recording the verdict." 13 Therefore, the defendant's absence at
any one of these stages in a felony prosecution would be reversible
error.
1 4
Although it is certain that a defendant has an undeniable
right to be present during the actual criminal trial, except when
the prosecution is for a misdemeanor,1 5 the question has arisen as
to his right to be present at certain other stages of the prosecution.
For example, it has been held that a defendant must be present
when the jury returns from retirement for further instructions,.
but that a defendant's absence from the courtroom is not improper
while his attorney argues that the jury should be discharged.'7
In the principal case, Judge Burke, speaking for the major-
ity,'8 implied that a pretrial hearing to suppress allegedly illegally
seized evidence 19 is, in fact, part of the trial2 0 Therefore, since
0 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
10 N.Y. CODE CRI,. PROC. § 356. Once the right to be present at trial
was established, it was held that neither the accused nor his counsel had the
power to waive it. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884). However, it is
generally held that if the accused is present at the beginning of the trial, and
later voluntarily leaves the courtroom, he has waived his constitutional right
to be present in felony cases. United States v. Noble, 294 Fed. 689 (D. Mont.
1923), aff'd, 300 Fed. 689 (9th Cir. 1924); Mulvey v. State, 41 So. 2d 157
(Fla. 1949).
143 N.Y. 1 (1870).
12 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1847, ch. 2, § 13.
3 Maurer v. People, 43 N.Y. 1, 3 (1870).
'4 Id. at 5.
15 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
16 People ex rel. Bartlam v. Murphy, 9 N.Y.2d 550, 175 N.E.2d 336, 215
N.Y.S2d 753 (1961) ; see People ex rel. Paulo v_ LaVallee, 22 App. Div. 2d
723, 253 N.Y.S.2d 312 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 15
N.Y.2d 482, 203 N.E.2d 800, 255 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1964).
17 People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 196 N.E.2d 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d
399 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 958 (1964).
Is Three judges dissented without opinion.
'
9 Defendant had moved to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 813-c of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section, enacted to conform with the
mandate of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), provides for a motion to
suppress evidence prior to trial. The purpose of section 813-c is merely to
provide an orderly procedure for application of the exclusionary rule. People
v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Both parties
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Section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a defend-
ant's presence during the trial, the Court concluded that the section
should be made applicable to pretrial motions to suppress evidence.
In support of its holding, the Court indicated that in the absence
of a special procedural rule dealing with a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence alleged to have been illegally seized, an objection
to the admissibility of such evidence would be made during the
actual trial when the evidence was offered. 21  In such instances,
the right to be present is unquestionable, and should not be lost
simply because the legislature has seen fit to provide a hearing
prior to trial.22
The Court emphasized the importance of the pretrial hearing
by indicating that it conclusively determines the admissibility of such
evidence for purposes of the trial. Therefore, defendant's absence
during such a hearing could substantially affect his cause since he
"alone may be able to inform his attorney of inconsistencies, errors
and falsities in the testimony of the officers or other witnesses." 23
Consequently, Judge Burke concluded that the interests of fairness
and the established public policy of New York required defendant's
presence at the pretrial hearing.24
Although decisional law prior to the instant case indicated
that a defendant has a right to be present at all critical stages of his
trial, that right does not require his presence at all proceedings in
the complete presentation of his case. It has always been held,
for example, that a defendant is not to be present during the argu-
ment of an appeal, or during motions concerning pure questions
may introduce evidence at the pretrial hearing relating to the seizure and
arrest before the motion is decided. People v. Lombardi, 18 App. Div. 2d
177, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1963).
20The Court admits that a pretrial hearing is not strictly within the
definition of "trial" as established by prior cases, but relies on People ex rel.
Steckler v. Warden, 259 N.Y. 430, 182 N.E. 73 (19321, wherein the Court
extended the definition of "trial" to include "the examination of criminal
cases by a court in all their stages." Id. at 432, 182 N.E. at 74.
21 People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 286, 213 N.E.2d 445, 447, 266
N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (1965).
22 Section 813-d of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides for
a motion to suppress during the actual trial if one of several specified con-
ditions is present: (1) defendant was unaware of seizure until after the trial
had been commenced; (2) defendant was aware of seizure prior to trial, but
did not obtain evidence of its illegality until after commencement of trial; or(3) defendant had not had adequate time or opportunity to make a pretrial
motion. Since defendant's presence would be insured if he were to make his
motion during the trial pursuant to section 813-d, it could be argued that his
presence should also be made mandatory if his motion is made prior to trial
pursuant to section 813-c. •2 3 Supra note 21, at 288, 213 N.E.2d at 447, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14.
24 The Court ruled that the unsuppressed evidence may have prejudiced the
-codefendant and, thus, his conviction was also set aside.
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of law either before or after trial.2 5  The present holding does
not alter this basic rule; it does, however, indicate that a pretrial
hearing to suppress evidence is an important stage of ,the prosecu-
tion. Of potentially greater significance is the fact that the Court
implied that a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence is now con-
sidered a part of the trial. It appears that all procedural safe-
guards, heretofore applicable to the actual trial, should now be
extended to the pretrial hearing as well.
By requiring the defendant's presence at a pretrial hearing,
the instant case is in conformity with the prevailing trend of
decisions which strive to afford the defendant all possible procedural
guarantees. In creating this procedural guarantee, the instant
case leaves to conjecture the scope of the right to be present at
other pretrial hearings. Nevertheless, one may surmise that Ander-
son will be extended to cover all other pretrial hearings, not merely
those brought to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 813-c of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, since no strict test or
rule was formulated, it is impossible, at the present time, to
determine with accuracy which pretrial or post-trial stages of the
prosecution will be deemed sufficiently "critical" that a defendant's
presence will be required.
Although the problem of retroactive application is certain to
be raised in future cases because of the present decision, the Court
did not discuss this issue.28  It would not appear that prior convic-
tions based on evidence ruled admissible in a defendant's absence
should be overturned merely because of a change in the law subse-
quent to the conviction. The cogency of the evidence was not
affected by the change in the law for, although the defendant was
not present at the pretrial determination of admissibility (prior to
Anderson), he nevertheless had the opportunity to raise all objec-
tions to its admission on appeal from the final conviction. The
courts should not be obligated to provide post-conviction remedies
to review questions that could have been raised on appeal.
27
In the recent case of Pointer v. Texas-,28 the United States
Supreme Court held that once it is determined that a defendant is
25 See, e.g., supra note 17, at 256, 196 N.E.2d at 58, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 401;
People v. Vail, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879); People v. Clark,
1 Park. Cr. Rep. 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
26 The possibility expressed here is made evident by recent holdings in:
People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965)
(coerced confessions); People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d 99, 227
N.Y.S.2d 421, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 850 (1962) (illegally seized evidence);
People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.-2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961)
(illegally seized evidence).
27 Compare People v. Muller, supra note 26, with People v. Huntley, supra
note 26.
28380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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entitled to be present at a pretrial hearing, he has the constitutional
right to the assisfance of counsel in the cross-examination of accusing
witnesses.2 9 When considered in conjunction with Pointer, the
practical effect of Anderson is to make it virtually impossible for a
defendant to be the victim of an' unfair pretrial hearing since his
presence, both personally and as represented by counsel, is now
guaranteed. In this way, an accused's rights cannot be prejudiced.
Although it may be possible that a defendant's rights may be
adequately protected in his absence, as Blackstone 30 observed, and
as implied in Anderson, the semblance of justice is essential to a
fair hearing. The traditions ingrained in our concept of a fair
and impartial trial mandate that an accused be personally present,
and that complete justice cannot be effected in his absence.
)X
MILITARY LAW - MANDAMUS - JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF COURT-
MARTIAL CONVICTION PROPER IN ACTION TO CoMPEL SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE TO CHANGE PETITIoNEa's DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE. -
After having been convicted of assault by a general court-martial
in 1947, appellant was given a dishonorable discharge from the
Navy. During the military trial, when appellant's codefendant gave
unexpected testimony which implicated appellant, the common
counsel for both parties asserted that he could no longer effectively
represent both men. Counsel's request for withdrawal was denied
and he was ordered to proceed with the defense. Eighteen years
later, in an action in the nature of mandamus,' appellant sought
to compel the Secretary of Defense to change the record of his
dismissal and to issue him an honorable discharge. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that because appellant was denied
effective counsel during the court-martial, the Secretary of Defense
29 See Note, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 244 (1965).
30 4 BLAcSN Or, COm MxTARmS *282-83.
1Appellant brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), which
gives the district courts "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer . . . of the United States . . . to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff." Enacted at the same time, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
(1964) permits the laying of venue, under the facts of this case in the district
of plaintiff's residence, and renders the defendant amenable to service of
process by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which
the action is brought. Prior to these provisions, an action in mandamus could
be brought only in the District of Columbia. E.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). For a complete analysis of the
use of the mandatory injunction as a method of avoiding the former juris-
dictional limitations on mandamus, see Note, 38 CoLui. L. RFv. 903 (1938).
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